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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In July 2007 Kemira Chemicals implemented a new ERP/MRP system in its North 
American Operations. The focus of this project is to compare inventory management 
practices at two Kemira plants both of which have long supply chains but elected to utilize 
the MRP system in different ways. The Prince George plant manages raw material 
inventories internally and the Bushy Park plant which is managed externally through the use 
of brokers. 
Due to the fact that forecasting is not customer order driven we can see considerable 
evidence of the "bullwhip" effect Lee et al, (1997). The four common bullwhipping 
behaviours: poor forecasting methods, order hatching, price variations and the rationing 
game have all been observed in both supply chains throughout the research period. Lee et al, 
(1997). Wherever possible visibility and control within the supply chain should be improved 
to mitigate risk. Christopher et al, (2004). 
The following recommendations should be implemented immediately. Bushy Park 
should fully employ all its purchasing activities in the ERP/MRP system. Communication 
should be improved between Kemira and its brokers to improve transparency of raw material 
inventory as it moves through the supply chain. A better methodology/discipline of 
forecasting should be executed immediately including a formal review process in cases 
where additional inventory is being ordered to take advantage of a price promotion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with managing inventories in a chemicals processing 
industry. Such industries have large fixed cost and thus are operated continuously with high 
volumes of throughput. With typical high volumes it is vital that firms closely monitor and 
manage the costs of their inventories. The firm under examination here implemented an ERP 
system in the belief that it would provide better inventory control. In this paper we explore 
the case of two sites of the firm in which it was clear that the sites were utilizing the ERP 
systems differently giving rise to markedly different results. This paper is to compare the 
ERP installation at these two sites in order to extract best features and to make 
recommendations on how to best manage inventories in such environments. 
The company under study is Kemira Chemicals (Kemira), a 2.8 billion EUR global 
chemical company. Kemira's revenues are derived from customers in the pulp and paper, 
municipal/industrial and oil and gas sectors. Kemira has over 140 sites operating in 40 
different countries with 9400 employees. Revenues in North America account for twenty-
three percent ofKemira's total revenues. 
In 2007 Kemira implemented a new ERP system consecutively in all locations around 
the globe. There were considerable costs associated with the implementation. As of the 
annual report ending 2008 Kemira has invested 42 million Euros in this implementation. 
Prior to implementing the ERP system each plant's purchasing department managed 
purchasing and inventory functions independently. One of the objectives of the new ERP 
system was to provide standardization to the planning process. Within the ERP system 
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Kemira adopted Material Requirements Planning (MRP) in order to better manage 
inventories at their diverse sites. 
"MRP is designed specifically to deal with dependent demand, acknowledging that 
demand for lower level items can be calculated based on upper demand level and do not have 
to be forecasted. Thus MRP presents a projection of future orders." Olhager et al, (2006). 
For the purposes of this study lower level items include raw materials and upper demand 
level items include finished products which are sold directly to Kemira's customers. 
Kemira operates many different types of production facilities in North America including 
production/manufacturing facilities, stocking warehouses, terminals/transloading facilities 
and third party tolling operations. There are twenty-one production and manufacturing 
facilities in North America, in these production plants the assets are owned and staffed by 
Kemira. 
Within Kemira's production plants the majority of raw materials are sourced 
domestically. Raw materials are readily available and are stocked from a vendor in close 
proximity to the production plant which allows for short lead times. There are however two 
important exceptions to this. The Prince George, British Columbia plant obtains 97% of its 
raw materials from China and the Goose Creek, South Carolina (Bushy Park) plant obtains 
74% from Chinese or Indian sources. These two plants are faced with unique challenges in 
managing its supply chain unlike the other production plants in North America. It is these 
two plants that is the focus of this project. 
The purpose of this research paper is a cross plant comparison of an ERP /MRP system; 
specifically a comparison of the purchasing function of the Prince George plant and the 
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Bushy Park plant installations to evaluate how the MRP system has performed. From 
January 1, 2009 to October 31,2009 Kemira's North American plants spent $193.5 million 
USD on raw materials. Bushy Park ranked 6th overall with a spend of$9.07 million and 
Prince George ranked 26th with $1.955 million for this same period. Both plants received the 
same formalized training during the ERP/MRP implementation and have attempted to 
manage its inventory as effectively as possible. 
Given the global nature ofKemira's business and the capital investment in the ERP/MRP 
system it is naturally vitally important that the MRP system is utilized as efficiently and 
effectively as possible in managing both raw material and finished product inventories. 
This project is to compare these two applications of the ERP/MRP system. Given that 
both plants implemented the basic system at the same time but elected to utilize it in a 
different manner, it provides an ideal opportunity to judge the impact of such a contrasting 
approach to managing inventories and evaluate if one approach is superior to the other from 
the perspective of Kemira. A variety of measures will be utilized to judge the effectiveness of 
the two systems. These include, among others, average month end inventory levels, 
frequency of stock outs, reduction in working capital needs, economics (purchase price and 
FOB landed cost) as well as raw material cost stability (from the view ofKemira). 
In the environments of interest in this research paper, we have lead times of four to eight 
weeks. We also have situations in which no sales forecasts are available. In such 
circumstances, managing a supply chain can prove to be a complex task. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a 
literature review relevant to the issue of managing global supply chains such as that 
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experienced by this firm. Chapter Two will provide a more detailed description of the 
implementation of the ERP/MRP systems at the two plants in question. Chapter Three will 
provide empirical comparisons of the two implementations with a view to extracting the 
important differences and lessons to be learned on how best to manage such inventories. 
Such comparisons will permit us to draw conclusions regarding the causes of observed 
results. In particular, although not exclusively, we can see considerable evidence of the 
"bullwhip" effect Lee et al, (1997) well documented in the literature and known to be 
prevalent in global supply chain environments. 
Finally, in Chapter Four, we will provide recommendations on how to improve the 
processes within the two plants and suggest a series of best practices to be shared with the 
rest of the organization including ways to counter-attack and mitigate the "bullwhip" effect 
Lee et al, (1997). We also suggest areas of further improvement in the MRP system being 
used. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Literature Review 
In conducting a relevant literature review, it is quite apparent that examples used by 
the various authors are drawn mainly from automotive and other manufacturing 
environments. As such, examples of operating supply chains within continuous processing 
facilities such as the chemical industry are not presented. However, many of the principles 
remain the same. Notwithstanding, in order to focus on our issues, we will relate the 
literature to our examples in order to demonstrate the generality of these principles. 
1.1 Bullwhipping 
"Bullwhipping" Lee et al, (1997) is a well recognized and highly problematic issue in 
managing complex global supply chains and can lead to excessive inventory, lost revenues 
and missed production schedules. Bullwhipping is usually seen when a forecast is not 
customer order driven. Hardly ever do forecasts remain unchanged and the longer the lead 
times are in a supply chain or more levels/parties involved in a supply chain the greater the 
risk for there to be imbalances between supply and demand. 
"Supply chains can be seen as systems, with complex interactions between different 
parts of the chain." Dejonckheere et al, (2003). Supply chain members in this research 
project include raw material manufacturers, raw material suppliers, logistic agents for ocean 
cargo, domestic transportation vendors, third party warehouses; Kemira's manufacturing 
facilities and Kemira's customers. 
Two forecasting models are currently being used by Kemira to manage customer 
demand in its supply chain. The first method is through Kemira's sales representatives 
communicating projected customer usages and reporting this information to a Kemira 
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production planner. The second, and the most widely used method, is through reviewing 
previous demand history. "Forecasting is a predictive process which by its very nature 
carries an element ofuncertainty" Mason-Jones et al, (2000). 
Historically bull whipping was viewed as a fact of life and a necessary evil in a supply 
chain. Early pioneers ofthis research include Forrester (1958), Sterman (1989) and Lee et al, 
( 1997) initially identified this phenomenon, arguing that the bullwhip effect and its effects 
were serious issues needing to be addressed in supply chains. According to Dejonckheere et 
al, (2003) "the bullwhipping phenomenon is unavoidable when forecasting is necessary; it is 
the price to pay to forecast unstable demand and to detect trends." Levy (1995) states "the 
situation is worsened, not bettered when international outsourcing is adopted. An 
international supply chain can generate substantial and unexpected costs when shipping and 
lead times are long. These costs take the form of expedited shipping, high inventories and 
lower demand fulfillment." "These longer lead times tend to just aggravate the information 
distortion." Lee et al, (2004) 
The cruxes of the effects ofbullwhipping are as Andraski (1994) put it "problems in 
supply chains are 80% people centre and 20% technology centered." Supply chain members 
make decisions based on the best information available at the time. It is the behaviour and 
response when there are shortages/stock outs/spikes in demand that supply chain members 
take action on which aggravate the bullwhip. "Bullwhip is a consequence of such a long and 
protracted chain, with every "player" double guessing what is really required .. .. double 
guessing between the various participants simply makes things worse." Disney et al, (2006). 
That is why "it is called the bullwhip effect because a little flick of the whip at the wrist will 
produce a big arc at the end of the whip." Leach (2008). Bean (2009) reiterates "decisions 
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made by groups along the supply chain actually worsen shortages and overstocks." This 
results in "orders to the supplier tending to have larger variances than the sales to the buyer" 
Lee et al, (2004) resulting in an inventory supply and demand imbalance. Lee et al, (2004) 
asserts that supply chain members need to be "rational and optimizing." 
itself: 
There are four common behaviours whereby the bullwhipping phenomenon reveals 
1. Poor Forecasting Methods 
Poor demand forecasting is a consequence of a forecast not being driven by a 
customer order. Due to the fact that forecasts are rarely accurate, there is either a 
scramble to obtain raw materials to meet customer demands or working capital 
being tied up in slower moving raw material stock. To mitigate this effect 
"demand forecasts must be updated based on observed demand." Lee et al, 
(2004). 
2. Order Batching 
"Many manufacturers place purchase orders with suppliers when they run their 
MRP systems. MRP systems are often run monthly, resulting in monthly ordering 
with suppliers. The supplier faces a highly erratic stream of orders. There is a 
spike in demand at one time during the month, followed by no demands for the 
rest of the month." Lee et al, (1997). Supply chain members need to be observers 
to distinguish and analyze when there truly is a demand spike that needs to be 
responded to with procurement of additional inventories. 
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3. Price Variations 
When purchase prices are not stable, there is a tendency for buyers to purchase 
more inventories when there is a price promotion. "The result is that customers 
buy in quantities that do not reflect their immediate needs, they buy in bigger 
quantities and stock up for the future." Lee et al, (1997). Ideally manufacturers 
should not participate in price promotions as price promotions aggravate the 
bullwhip effect. 
4. The Rationing Game 
The rationing game is usually prevalent in retail industries . The rationing game is 
observed when product demand exceeds supply. "When this happens a 
manufacturer often rations its product to retailers. To try and secure more 
inventories the retailer will issue an order which exceeds the quantity the retailer 
would normally order if the supply of the product was unlimited." Lee et al, 
(2004). When this occurs the manufacturer is not able to determine what the 
retailers demand actually is causing the manufacturer to ration its inventory of the 
product even more. 
Given the nature that forecasts are not customer order driven in the Prince George and 
Bushy Park plant many of these behaviours are believed to be present at various times 
throughout the research project period. These bullwhipping effects will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4. 
1.2 Countering the Bullwhip Effect 
Countering the effects of bullwhipping and gaining control of a supply chain is 
accomplished through a variety of means . "Supply chain management requires co-operation 
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and co-ordination." Svensson (2005). "The best way to reduce uncertainty within the order 
information pipeline is to ensure everyone in the supply chain gets the most up-to-date and 
useful information." Mason-Jones et al, (2000). "Only through informational sharing and 
tight coordination can one regain control of supply chain efficiency ." Lee et al, (2002). "A 
robust supply chain requires frequent data exchanges amount inner-company processes and 
outside suppliers processes." Umeda et al, (2006). 
There should be a coordinated and transparent process of forecasting, ideally 
throughout the supply chain. Such coordination is designated to one person to ensure a 
coherent and properly functioning forecasting plan is in place. Improved communication and 
information sharing between supply chain members must be continually developed. Lead 
times should be updated and reflective of changing market conditions and shortened 
wherever possible. 
1.3 Risk Spiral 
Both Prince George and Bushy Park are also exposed to a great amount of risk in 
each of their respective supply chains. Christopher et al, (2004) have presented a useful 
framework for viewing a "Risk Spiral." The "Risk Spiral" depicted in Figure 1 is evidenced 
naturally by the fact that there is a long pipeline. When this long pipeline is combined with 
lack of visibility of where inventory is in the pipeline the supply chain is exposed to even 
more risk. If there is a lack of confidence in customer demand there could be too much or 
too little raw material ordered resulting in stock outs or over stocks. The result is that 
customer demand is not met on time and in full or there are increased raw material costs by 
expediting raw materials. According to Christopher et al, (2004) the way to break the risk 
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spiral is to address two basic elements visibility and control to improve confidence in the 
supply chain. 
We suggest that both Prince George and Bushy Park will benefit from having 
increased visibility, transparency and communication as raw material moves throughout the 
supply chain by reducing the risks associated with managing the raw material inventories. 
When information is shared it reduces uncertainty and improves confidence in the supply 
chain. As visibility and confidence is attained it could also result in reducing safety stock 
and build-up of inventory buffers. 
One way to break the risk spiral is to build-up buffers and safety stock. "Safety 
stock is a function of cycle service level, the demand uncertainty, the replenishment lead time 
and the lead time uncertainty." Chopra et al, (2004). 
Figure 1 Risk Spiral (Christopher, M & Lee, H. 2004) 
Another area that supply chains can be exposed to risk is when raw materials are 
sourced by a single supplier. Within long pipelines there is the possibility that there could be 
raw material manufacturing delays, shipping delays or even labor strikes at the port of 
disembarkation. If a manufacturing plant relies heavily on only one supplier the plant is 
exposed to great risk if something is delayed or if something catastrophic occurs that the 
supplier is not able to fulfill its customer orders. Although purchase order commitments and 
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confirmation may have been made, there is no real confidence or assurance in the actual 
delivery date until the raw material is at the port and ready to be ocean shipped. To mitigate 
this risk multiple suppliers should be engaged at all times so that if one supplier is delayed or 
unable to supply raw material, raw material is still in the supply chain from the other source. 
By executing the countering effects that the bullwhip can have on a supply chain and 
increasing visibility and control to reduce the risk spiral Prince George and Bushy Park can 
improve confidence in each respective supply chain. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 Overview of the Prince George Plant 
The Prince George Plant obtains 97% of its raw material requirements from various 
sources in China. Raw material purchase orders are placed directly to the Chinese 
manufacturer or agent and the product which is shipped in forty foot containers from various 
ports in China directly to the Prince George plant. Containers are unloaded and inventory is 
stored on site in Kemira's production plant. For simplicity in this paper, we will refer to this 
raw material product simply as PG-Raw throughout. 
The Prince George plant manufactures one product which, again for the purpose of 
simplicity we will refer to as PG-Final hereafter. This product is sold in bulk and in 
intermediate bulk containers called totes. Kemira monitors its customer's inventory through 
an e-mail which reports the daily level in the storage tank. Monitoring of the customer 
inventory levels through historical customer usages is the only mechanism Kemira has 
available to determine customer demand. Kemira analyses historical customer usages to 
determine the PG-Final production schedule and procure appropriate inventory of raw 
materials. 
The Chinese suppliers ofPG-Raw insist on three weeks lead time to prepare and 
bring raw material to a predetermined Port of China when a new purchase order is placed. 
Transit times are currently sixteen days resulting in a 37 day total replenishment lead time. 
Kemira instructs its vendors on which vessel to ship the container and there is now visibility 
of the estimated time of arrival of the container since it has begun receiving containers 
through the Port of Prince Rupert. A reduction in ten days transit time and reduced 
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transportation costs have also been realized. In addition, Kemira now has complete visibility 
throughout all of the stages in the entire supply chain. Previously there had been no visibility 
from the time the purchase order was placed with the Chinese vendor until the container was 
delivered to Prince George. Under the new model of shipping through the Port ofPrince 
Rupert there is information now available which enables Kemira to respond quickly to 
demand fluctuations or raw material delays which should result in better inventory 
management decisions. 
Several factors influence the procurement practices ofPG-Raw. History has 
repeatedly revealed that the price ofPG-Raw is always the highest around Chinese New 
Year. This season is plagued with severe constraints in raw material availability due to 
planned plant shutdowns and limitations in ocean cargo shipping space. In order to mitigate 
these conditions Prince George orders raw material inventory in advance and avoids placing 
new raw material orders during the first quarter of each year. 
Customer's requirements for PG-Final can be directly linked to global market 
demands for pulp. If global market conditions are poor customers can eliminate this product 
entirely or significantly reduce the application rates that PG-Final is applied at. 
To summarize, the Prince George plant operates with no sales forecast other than data 
obtained from monitoring customer daily usage rates. Raw material inventory is managed 
internally and procured directly from China. The Prince George plant manufactures PG-
Final, monitors the customer inventory and delivers PG-Final directly to its customers. All 
of this is managed internally and Kemira has moderate visibility of the total supply chain. 
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2.2 Overview of the Bushy Park Plant 
The Bushy Park plant is a colorants plant manufacturing dyes and pigments for a 
variety of customers. These dyes include seasonally colored holiday napkins or the red 
colored logo you see on a Wendy's restaurant napkin. 
The Bushy Park plant operates with a six month sales forecast. This forecast is 
initiated by an internal sales force coordinated through the Colorants Product Manager. The 
six month forecast becomes the basis for the forecasted demand at the specific customer/item 
level. From this sales forecast Kemira can plan its monthly production schedule and 
determine its future raw material requirements. 
For several decades Bushy Park has chosen to work with brokers to manage its 
inventories from China and India. Today it is the only Kemira plant to manage raw material 
inventories jointly through external vendors. Specifically two brokers manage 56% of the $9 
million raw material spends at the plant. The first reason brokers were chosen in Bushy Park 
were because the sales forecast typically had not been reliable. The brokers mitigated risk of 
sales forecast inaccuracies by warehousing an additional two months of raw material 
inventory for Kemira. As well, this acted as a safety stock buffer due to long lead times of 
six to eight weeks. If the forecast changed or demand increased, raw material was readily 
available to be delivered to Bushy Park "just in time" (JIT) Sugimore et al, (1977) so Kemira 
could produce finished product and meet its customer demand. 
The second reason brokers were chosen were because the plant had to meet stringent 
operational targets to maintain the lowest level of raw material inventory and to reduce 
working capital needs. Brokers solved this dilemma by providing consignment. Raw 
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material was allocated and available to Bushy Park in close proximity to the plant. However 
the raw material did not have to be paid for until it was physically delivered. 
Operational ease is the third reason that brokers were chosen in Bushy Park. The 
plant could operate with more production capacity and less raw material storage capacity. 
The plant could shift the burden and risk to the broker as it was the broker's responsibility to 
keep raw material in the supply chain to meet Kemira's customer demands which were 
unpredictable. 
Kemira meets regularly with each broker and openly communicates its upcoming raw 
materials forecast needs. When Bushy Park is ready to use a raw material in production, a 
purchase order is issued and the inventory is delivered. Such deliveries are a JIT strategy 
Sugimore et al, (1977) since the broker (the vendor to Kemira) can deliver almost 
instantaneously to the Kemira plant. 
Customer orders once received at the Bushy Park plant dictate changes to the plant 
production schedule. The plant produces a variety of finished products which have long 
cycle times and require tank washouts upon completion of a batch. The plant sells finished 
product is a variety of packages including tank trucks, intermediate bulk containers and 
drums. 
In summary, Bushy Park has chosen to manage their inventory requirements through 
a broker. These two brokers procure raw material, manage and warehouse Kemira's raw 
material. Raw material is delivered JIT Sugimore et al, (1977). Forecast swings or errors are 
mitigated and the risk is shifted to the broker who carries the plant's raw material inventory 
burden. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Cross Plant Comparison 
Prince George had chosen to manage all of its raw material requirements internally 
whereas Bushy Park is managed externally through brokers. The purpose of this research 
project is to determine if one method is superior and/or to establish best practices to share 
with the rest of the organization. At the heart of managing a supply chain is the handling of 
inventories; that is, the MRP system. In Prince George the MRP system is internally 
managed as part of the larger ERP system. In Bushy Park, MRP involves the use ofbrokers. 
Hamilton et al, (1981) lists seven objectives of an MRP system. However his categorization 
of objectives extends well beyond straightforward inventory management (into higher level 
corporate objectives) which is the focus of this paper. Hence, from his list we have 
synthesized two MRP objectives against which to evaluate the issues here in this paper. The 
following are the two MRP objectives: 
1. Minimize Inventory Levels 
2. Improve product availability and enhance inventory control. Hamilton et al, (1981 ). 
If an MRP system does have these inventory objectives, we should be able to evaluate and 
judge the effectiveness of the Prince George and the Bushy Park plants on the following 
criteria since the onset of the ERP/MRP implementation: 
• Is there evidence of improved inventories and working capital requirements post-
ERP implementation? 
• Is there visibility in the raw material supply chain? 
• How stable have raw material prices been? 
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• Have increasing raw materials costs been passed along to Kemira's customers? 
• Identifying differences in costs structures between internally and externally 
managed inventories? 
• Have the plants been able to meet customer demands? 
• Has our use of the MRP system resulted in less frequent stock outs in one location 
over the other? (We must remember that this is a cross-plant comparison, not a 
pre-post comparison. Hence we cannot address the issue of whether either plant 
has lower stock outs as a result of the implementation of the MRP system 
compared to the pre-MRP phase). 
• Can the plants quickly respond to changing customer demands? 
The period of data analysis will begin in July 1, 2007 when both plants began using 
the ERP system until December 31, 2009 for a total of 30 data points. For Prince George the 
main raw material PG-Raw will be analyzed as well as the sales demand for the finished 
product PG-Final. Two raw materials used in Bushy Park will be analyzed. For reference 
we will refer to the raw materials at Bushy Park as BP-Rawl and BP-Raw2; which are 
critical components in two finished products, hereafter referred to as BP-Final1&2 and BP-
Final3. (BP-Final1&2 is the same finished product however sold in two different packages. 
Hence we can treat them as one product for the purposes of this paper). 
3.1 Evidence of improved inventories and working capital requirements post ERP 
implementation. 
Prince George has experienced significant variability in raw material inventories over 
the thirty month period as shown in Figure 2. During the time that Prince George was able to 
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use vendor consignment (July 2007 to August 2008) the raw material inventories and 
working capital requirements were under strict control. Vendor consignment is a form of a 
broker as it permits risk mitigation. Although Kemira's working capital requirements are 
lower under vendor consignment, the brokers increase their raw material costs to cover costs 
such as financing charges which ultimately results in a higher raw material cost from the 
broker. As soon as vendor consignment terms were not available, inventory and working 
capital requirements increased substantially in Prince George (Figure 2, January 2009). 
In October 2008 Kemira's largest customer announced that it would stop usage of 
PG-Final. No formal contract language was in place to deal with the customer discontinuing 
usage ofPG-Final unexpectedly. The customer stopped using PG-Final on the basis of 
difficult economic times due to a saturation in the global pulp market and needing to 
eliminate costs wherever possible until market pulp prices improved. In October 2008 when 
the customer announced discontinuing the use of PG-Final there was no opportunity to stop 
or postpone the flow ofPG-Raw in the supply chain as it had already shipped from China. 
Some financial burden was postponed under a vendor consignment agreement, but 
nonetheless in February 2009 PG-Raw inventories soared to $1,654,068 USD. Kemira 
Prince George carried PG-Raw inventory for this customer from October 2008 until July 
2009 when the customer demand returned. 
23 
$1,800,000 
$1,600,000 
$1,400,000 
$1,200,000 
$1,000,000 
Figure 2- PG-Raw Inventory Value at Month End USD 
.A. 
(' 
I 
I 
I 
/""-... I 
I -
"""' \ 
\ 
\ 
' 
$800,000 
$600,000 
$400,000 
$200,000 I " I \1\./ 
$- I ' / v v 
Overall, Bushy Park managed its BP-Rawl and BP-Raw2 working capital 
requirements well however the effects of"bullwhipping" Lee et al, (1997) struck both raw 
material supply chains during the data research period. In June 2009 inventory ofBP-Rawl 
spiked to $767,294 USD as depicted in Figure 3 and in December 2008 inventory ofBP-
Raw2 reached $379,689 USD as portrayed in Figure 4. More detailed analysis of the effects 
of "bull whipping" Lee et al, (1997) will be described in Section 3. 7. 
In comparison to Figure 2, we can see that Bushy Park (Figure 3 & 4) has maintained 
much more stable monthly inventory management. While inventory value at Bushy Park has 
increased over the research data period, the variability is quite small. This provides some 
evidence of the difference in inventory management approaches at the two plants with the 
use of brokers in Bushy Park yielding much more stable inventory flows than that seen in the 
self-managed Prince George plant. The Bushy Park brokers can warehouse Kemira's raw 
material inventories until the time that the raw material needs to be used in production a JIT 
strategy. Sugimore et al, (1977). 
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Figure 3- BP-Rawl Inventory Value at Month End USD 
Figure 4- BP-Raw2 Inventory Value at Month End USD 
Through the use of brokers Bushy Park has been able to minimize working capital 
requirements for the plant. The average month end inventory value in Prince George was 
$460,137 USD versus $162,641 USD ofBP-Rawl and $64,820 USD for BP-Raw2. 
Kemira's weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is 7% so annual interest charges for 
carrying inventory are approximately $32,209.59 USD in Prince George versus $11,384.89 
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USD in Bushy Park for BP-Rawl and $4,537.39 USD for BP-Raw2. Bushy Park's 
inventories and working capital would be significantly more if they did not have these 
external brokers. It is worth noting as well that in Bushy Park there is currently not enough 
warehouse space at the plant to store all of the raw material requirements. Hence Kemira 
would need to secure public storage and would incur additional transportation charges. The 
brokers currently provide this service but ultimately at a cost to Kemira. 
Internally managed inventory in Prince George and externally managed inventory 
in Bushy Park is the difference between these two plants as each plant has adopted different 
inventory management strategies. 
3.2 Visibility in the raw material supply chain. 
By actively managing its inventories within the ERP system, Prince George has high 
visibility of inventory stocks and flows in the supply chain. Specific container shipment 
dates, container number and vessel arrival information are known. Currently in Bushy Park 
there is no such visibility or communication of the inventory status while in the supply chain. 
Inventory is updated via a monthly meeting with the broker who provides inventory updates. 
All raw materials are warehoused in the Prince George plant so inventory counts 
and/or discrepancies could be reconciled quickly. In Bushy Park the inventory is not 
physically on site at the plant so a vendor must be contacted, who in turn needs to obtain this 
information from its contracted warehouse in order to confirm raw material availability and 
quantities. 
All purchase orders are entered into the MRP system in Prince George at the time the 
order is placed so there is visibility in the ERP/MRP system. In Bushy Park purchase orders 
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are not entered into the ERP/MRP system until there is an immediate production requirement 
in the plant. An excel spreadsheet is shared between Kemira and the broker to keep track of 
all of the raw material inventories and is updated continuously. This excel spreadsheet must 
be checked to verify actual available inventories from the brokers. 
In Prince George Kemira has control of the supply chain in that the raw material 
inventory is managed internally. Prince George is directly responsible and accountable for 
the procurement of raw materials. This responsibility is not shared with the vendor. In 
Bushy Park control is shared and the plant shares risk and responsibility with the broker. 
Ultimately Bushy Park is accountable for procurement of raw material however the broker is 
evaluated by Bushy Park on the basis of having inventory on hand in their warehouse for 
Kemira when demand dictates a requirement. One of the strengths of the Bushy Park supply 
chain is the trust and mutual confidence the plant has with the brokers. However, obviously 
there is a financial incentive for the broker. Both brokers are private companies and the 
financial health of these companies is not publicly available. 
3.3 Stability of raw material prices. 
One similar critical shock experienced by both Prince George and Bushy Park was 
the impact of the Beijing Olympics (August 2008) on the supply chain. It would be 
unreasonable to expect either of these two plants to have predicted the shock. However the 
robustness of the system in place to handle such unique risks (shocks) is certainly a vital 
component on an MRP system. No one could have predicted what would happen to raw 
material pricing and availability pre and post Olympics (Beijing 2008), but both Prince 
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George and Bushy Park responded as best they could to the signals and constraints evidenced 
in the market place based on the best information available each plant had at the time. Of the 
three raw materials PG-Raw pricing remained the most stable throughout the research period. 
BP-Rawl has been hit the hardest with raw material price increases and nineteen months 
later has still not recovered to pre-Olympic (Beijing 2008) pricing. BP-Raw2 pricing 
escalated as a result of the bullwhipping rationing game and will be described in more detail 
in section 3.7. Lee et al, (1997). It took ten months for raw material costs to return to pre-
Olympic pricing. 
A significant purchasing mistake was made in August 2008 in Prince George. 
Kemira' s sales department was demanding raw material price relief which purchasing 
achieved however the sales department should have been communicating with the customer 
to understand the customer needs and future demands. A purchase order for eight containers 
ofPG-Raw was placed to take advantage of a price promotion. The price promotion 
represented a savings of $94,000 or raw material priced at 13% below market pricing 
however, the raw material inventories of PG-Raw were adequate at the time. In reality, it 
would have been very hard to predict that the PG-Final customers would stop usage ofPG-
Final. A purchasing decision was made to take advantage of a $94,000 savings yet $10,000 
were spent in warehousing and transportation costs, $630,000 was tied up in net working 
capital and the inventory carried for more than six months and an estimated $22,050 in 
interest charges were paid (W ACC 7% ). This illustrates the type of poor management that 
can occur when decisions are handled myopically and is another instance of the effects that 
"bullwhipping" Lee et al, ( 1997) can have on a supply chain. Kemira modified its order 
pattern to take advantage of a price discount when, as it turned out, Kemira didn't really need 
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the raw materials. Better visibility of demand expectations by Prince George customers and 
system-wide communication of expectations might well have avoided this. Equally, the new 
contractual arrangements between Prince George and its customer, referred to above, would 
have mitigated much of these costs if communications were not fully transparent. 
The average purchase price for PG-Raw was $3.48/Kg. The average price ofBP-
Rawl was $12.61/Kg and for BP-Raw2 was $3.39. As you can see the price ofBP-Rawl is 
three times the price as PG-Raw and BP-Raw2. Both PG-Raw and BP-Raw2 have returned 
to pre-Olympic (2008 Beijing) pricing however BP-Rawl has still not seen any relief. 
Figure 5- Raw Material Costs July 2007- December 2009 US/KG 
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3.4 Passing along raw material costs to customers. 
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Figure 6 depicts the finished product gross margins from December 2007 to 
- PG-Raw 
BP-Raw1 
- BP-Raw2 
December 2009. (One should note that the gross margin data in all three finished products 
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from July 2007 to November 2007 is suspect due to issues involved in implementing the ERP 
system. Thus this information has not been included). 
Both BP-Rawl based products BP-Finall&2 are the only finished products that 
avoided a negative profit margin. On the other hand Bushy Park was not able to fulfill all of 
the customer demand for BP-Final1&2 and had to declare force majeure and lost customers 
as a result. 
BP-Final 3 was sold under negative profit margins conditions for almost ten months 
until the BP-Raw2 pricing returned to pre-Olympic (Beijing 2008) pricing. The increased 
BP-Raw2 raw material costs were absorbed and were not able to be passed along to its 
customers. 
PG-Final experienced a negative profit margin from July-August 2009. Market prices 
ofPG-Raw had fallen to a ten year low and Prince George's inventory was 60% higher than 
the market price. 
Similarly all three finished products experienced lower gross margins when higher 
priced raw materials were procured during the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 
PG-Final is far more sensitive to price variability in PG-Raw than the raw material 
BP-Rawl and BP-Raw2 which are used in BP-Final1&2 and BP-Final3 respectively. 
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Figure 6- Finished Product Gross Margins December 2007 -December 2009 
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3.5 Identifying differences in costs structures between internally and externally 
managed inventories? 
Procurement ofPG-Raw, BP-Rawl and BP-Raw2 would all have some currency 
fluctuations from the Chinese RMB and Indian rupee. These exchange fluctuations are not 
included in the cost structures analysis for the purposes of this research project as their 
effects are small and relatively insignificant. 
The cost ofPG-Raw is determined by the FOB China price of the raw material, ocean 
shipping charges and local trucking charges from the Port of Prince Rupert to Prince George. 
Transportation charges represent 5.3% of the total PG-Raw total landed cost to Prince 
George. 
There are several additional charges that are added to the raw material costs ofBP-
Rawl and BP-Raw2 as a broker is used to manage Bushy Park's inventory. These additional 
charges include warehousing costs, palletizing, shrink wrapping, and strapping, local 
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transportation and storage fees herein referred to as broker handling fees. These broker 
handling fees represent 14% of the total landed raw material cost to the Bushy Park plant 
from the broker or approximately $700,000 per year1• Not included in the analysis are the 
finance charges that the broker would factor into the cost of the raw material. One suspects 
that the broker has some ambiguity and/or uncertainly when and in what quantity they will 
actually make a delivery to Bushy Park. Such ambiguity would increase the broker risk and, 
as we discuss below, we would expect the broker to militate such risk by increasing the 
delivered raw material cost to Bushy Park. 
3.6 Comparing customer demands at the Prince George and Bushy Park plants. 
The central value of an MRP system is its ability to aid in meeting customer demands. 
As we will show in our data analysis of plant performance, Prince George has been able to 
meet all of its sales demand. Although the raw material PG-Raw may have been scarce or in 
short supply at times, the customer demands for PO-Final have always been met. The plant 
reports a 100% order fill rate and on time shipments 99.9% ofthe time. 
Bushy Park on the other hand has had some difficulties with the supply ofBP-Rawl 
which will be discussed further in section 3.7. The raw material BP-Rawl was in very short 
supply and Kemira was not able to meet its customer demands for BP-Final1&2. Customers 
were placed on reduced allocation and in several cases Kemira declared force majeure2. 
Kemira lost several customers as a result of the incidence. 
1 The 14% was a value supplied by the broker 
2 Force majeure is defined "unforeseeable circumstances that present someone from fulfilling 
a contract." (Force Majeure Reference) 
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3.7 Frequency of Stock Outs. 
Prince George has managed the raw material inventory ofPG-Raw historically 
through vendor consignment. Under the terms of vendor consignment PG-Raw was procured 
and delivered to Prince George. PG-Raw was not paid for until it was actually consumed in 
production. A month end physical inventory count was conducted, inventories were 
reconciled and the quantities reported to the vendor. An invoice would be supplied by the 
vendor and prompt payment made. PG-Raw could be kept on site under vendor consignment 
terms for six months. After six months Kemira would be invoiced for all remaining 
quantities on hand. Unlike typical consignment agreements, PG-Raw could not be returned. 
Kemira was committed to all quantities procured. 
Figure 7 below depicts the month end inventory balance for PG-Raw. The black 
represents the inventory on hand which Kemira has a financial commitment. The grey line is 
consignment inventory ofPG-Raw that is on-hand in Prince George but not paid for. Kemira 
Prince George was able to postpone some of the financial impact to the extent that it had a 
six month grace period before the payment for inventories was required. Unfortunately a 
change in suppliers in the fourth quarter of 2008 resulted in the vendors not being able to 
continue vendor consignment terms. The switch in inventory management practices in the 
middle of the data period is evidenced in Figure 7 when the consignment stock ofPG-raw 
was completely eliminated in January 2008. This also co-insides and explains in Figure 2 
why the working capital requirements substantially increased ofPG-Raw in January 2008. 
A stock out occurred in October 2007 ofPG-Raw due to customer demand increasing 
at the Prince George Plant. No customers experienced disruptions ofPG-Final but in 
response to this outage, extra inventory ofPG-Raw was ordered to fill the supply chain 
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pipeline and PG-Raw inventory spiked to 450,000 Kgs in January 2008. By the time the 
extra inventory arrived, customer's demands had significantly shifted. This behaviour and 
distortion in information is a classic example of "bull whipping" Lee et al, ( 1997) and its 
effects it can have on inventory management practices. Supply chain members responded to 
the increase demand in October 2007 by ordering additional PG-Raw, however the demand 
was just a spike and within one month the supply chain returned to normal. There was no 
way to stop the additional inventory procured and by January 2008 the Prince George plant 
had significant overstock ofPG-Raw. 
A second stock out ofPG-Raw almost occurred in September 2009. Kemira's 
customer demand ofPG-Final was increasing and Kemira could not replenish its supply 
chain quickly enough. This stock out was prompted by extremely low levels of raw material 
inventory being available from China as well as difficulties in obtaining ocean shipping 
space. The PG-Raw manufacturing plants in China were running at significantly lower 
production capacity due to overall decreased global demand ofPG-Raw so they needed 
longer than normal lead time to manufacture and prepare raw material for export. One plant 
for example was running at 90% lower production rates than the same time the previous year. 
Another problem attributed to the effects of bull whipping was that historically when 
PG-Raw was purchased it was ordered in batches of containers, a single purchase order could 
contain two to six containers shipped all at the same time. This created surging flows from 
order hatching resulting in raw material inventory spikes. To ease these spikes the Prince 
George Plant started placing purchase orders based on only one or two containers and 
spacing the purchasing orders so that deliveries were spread out over the course of a calendar 
month. This strategy is referred to as "order smoothing." Dejonckheere et al, (2002). 
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Figure 7- Month End Inventory (Kgs) PG-Raw July 2007- December 2009 
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The presumption is that Bushy Park should not have as many swings in inventory as 
the brokers are supposed to be carrying Bushy Park's monthly inventories. Bushy Park has 
overall maintained lower levels of inventory up to a maximum of 50,000 Kgs. Figure 8 
depicts the shortages ofBP-Rawl in which raw material scarcity wreaked havoc on the 
supply chain from January to April2009. 
The events that lead up to the shortages in January 2009 however could have been 
avoided if Bushy Park had been fully aware of the situation of the Chinese source ofBP-
Rawl. It seems a communication gap between Bushy Park, brokers and the Chinese supplier 
created an avoidable but disastrous situation for Bushy Park. In July 2008 one month prior to 
the Beijing Olympics the chemical factory had to shut down the production ofBP-Rawl as 
the chemical factory operated within the 1000 kilometer radius of Beijing. No hazardous 
chemicals could be produced or transported within this 1000 kilometer radius in anticipation 
of the August 2008 Beijing Olympics. The chemical factory was unable to receive raw 
materials and therefore had to shut down the production line ofBP-Rawl. The area in 
Shanghai that the chemical factory operated had also developed into a densely populated 
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residential area. The local Chinese government no longer wanted a chemical factory that 
produced hazardous chemicals operating in the area. The local government ultimately 
exerted its power and successfully cut off the water supply to this factory. The factory was 
rendered helpless and was forced to relocate its operations in China to other areas designed 
for industriaVchemical production. This chemical factory represented 56% of the raw 
material supply ofBP-Rawl into Bushy Park. The production supply ofBP-Rawl was 
eliminated in July 2008, however Bushy Park did not see shortages ofBP-Rawl until 
January 2009, six months after the Chinese factory ofBP-Rawl was shut down. Had Bushy 
Park been totally informed of the situation in China and the troubles within the chemical 
factory, Bushy Park could have responded sooner and mitigated its risk. At the time of this 
writing this Chinese source ofBP-Rawl has resumed production in its new operations in 
another province in China however they will not be able to supply Kemira's requirements for 
BP-Rawl until at least the fourth quarter of2010. 
It was not until March 2009 (9 months after the Chinese Source ofBP-Rawl stopped 
production) that the Bushy Park Plant Manager persuaded a German source ofBP-Rawl to 
begin production specifically to meet Kemira's needs for this raw material. Shipments were 
delivered to Bushy Park beginning in May 2009 and continued until June 2009. This vendor 
typically has chosen to operate its production equipment with other more profitable product 
lines rather than with BP-Rawl. 
The force majeure in the product's BP-Finall &2 were a direct result of the Chinese 
source ofBP-Rawl not being able to fulfill Kemira's purchase orders. This exposed the 
plant to unnecessary risk. The plant did learn from this experience, in 2009 the plant 
purchased from three sources 27%, 34% and 39% respectively. The sourcing strategy now 
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includes the inclusion of several sources for this product at all times to mitigate risk and the 
risk spiral. Christopher et al, (2004). This situation illustrates why visibility and open 
communication with suppliers is so important in these long supply chains. The Chinese 
source ofBP-Rawl was able to continue to supply Bushy Park its short term requirements of 
BP-Rawl, however it did not communicate that it was not able to produce more inventory. 
This is why the effects in Kemira's supply chain did not reveal BP-Rawl shortages until 
January 2009 (six months later). IfKemira had understood the situation with the Chinese 
source ofBP-Rawl in July/August 2008, the German source ofBP-Rawl could have been 
contacted in the fourth quarter of 2008 which potentially could have eliminated the shortages 
that Bushy Park faced with from having to declare force majeure ofBP-Final1&2. 
Figure 8- Month End Inventory (Kgs) BP-Rawl July 2007- December 2009 
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Bushy Park successfully managed its BP-Raw2 requirements with its brokers in 2007 
and in the first quarter of 2008. Too much BP-Raw2 inventory was ordered in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 and inventories spiked in June 2008 and again in December 2008 as shown in 
Figure 9. Pre/post the Beijing 2008 Olympics raw material prices soared as many factories 
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were forced to close over environmental concerns, the global economy boomed and many 
raw materials were in high demand. This fear of raw material shortage prompted one of 
Kemira's brokers who had 70% share of this business to procure and secure additional BP-
Raw2. The BP-Raw2 was delivered to Bushy Park in the fourth quarter of 2008 and from 
January to May 2009 the plant did not need to receive further deliveries. This illustrates 
another example ofbullwhipping; specifically the effects of raw material rationing and 
gaming. Lee et al, (1997). The fear in the market place that the raw material may not be 
available in the future prompted this broker to secure higher priced inventory to mitigate 
expected concerns of not being able to obtain it in the future. The fact that Kemira and its 
broker responded to this fear, is another example of how supply chain member's behaviour 
amplifies the bullwhip effect. Andraski (1994). Not only did the plant carry additional raw 
material inventories, the raw material cost at the time carried a premium because it was in 
short supply and the profit margins of the BP-Final3 suffered greatly until all of the higher 
price raw material was consumed. 
Figure 9- Month End Inventory (Kgs) BP-Raw2 July 2007- December 2009 
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In Prince George the observance of increased demand signals resulted in supply chain 
members procuring additional PG-Raw which resulted in overstocks. In Bushy Park lack of 
information and understanding of the Chinese supplier of the BP-Rawl situation crippled the 
supply chain. The effects of the rationing game Lee et al, (1997) was observed and supply 
chain members responded procuring additional BP-Raw2 which also resulted in overstocks. 
The similarities between the three raw material examples is that supply chain members 
behaviour ultimately affected the supply chain and resulted in some negative consequences. 
In contrast although Bushy Park was able to mitigate some financial risk in terms of 
inventory working capital because of the use of brokers (which could not be done in Prince 
George), it was not able to mitigate its risk of the increased raw material cost especially in 
the case ofBP-Raw2. Eventually the higher priced BP-Raw2 was purchased and used in 
production in Bushy Park and finished product margins ofBP-Final3 suffered. 
Ultimately there was increased variability in demand in Prince George illustrating the 
higher risk associated with inventories ofPG-Raw arriving directly into Prince George. 
Counterbalancing this we can see a lower average raw material carrying cost albeit there is 
an almost immediate impact of a financial burden. One sees decreased variability in demand 
indicating lower risk because of the use of brokers carrying the inventories (and the costs) 
but such lower variability comes with a significantly higher carrying cost. 
3.8 Impacts of MRP introduction on rapid response to changing customer demands. 
Kemira Prince George has had two long periods of demand interruptions ofPG-Final. 
The first occurred in 2001 (not in the research data period) and again in 2009. Both of these 
demand interruptions were attributed to poor global pulp market conditions and customers 
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slowing down pulp production in their own operations to bring global pulp inventories back 
into supply and demand balance. 
When Kemira 's customers stopped usage ofPG-Final unexpectedly in the fourth 
quarter 2009 on hand inventory ofPG-Raw was 357,600 Kgs with no sales demand. Prince 
George did recover much more quickly from the 2009 sales demand interruption and within 
nine months new PG-Raw inventory was procured. This highlights a need that Prince 
George needs to have better connection to its customer demands linked through MRP. New 
contract terms have been negotiated with Kemira's customer to ensure that all inventory on 
hand or in transit ofPG-Raw must be sold/consumed before the customer can stop using PG-
Final. These new contract terms have reduced the risk that Kemira Prince George has 
previously been exposed to in the long supply chain ofPG-Raw. It is not uncommon for PG-
Raw inventory to be in the pipeline sixty to ninety days in advance. For the customer this 
means that notification of stopping usage ofPG-Final today will mean the customer is still 
contractually obligated to use PG-Final for three to four months. This provides incentive for 
Kemira's customer to communicate with the Prince George plant to ensure appropriate PG-
Raw inventory levels are maintained and approval obtained for inventory replenishment 
providing greater visibility in the supply chain upstream. 
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Figure 10- PG-Final Sales July 2007- December 2009 (Kgs) 
Figure 11 depicts the sales demand for the three final products of Bushy Park. Sales 
for BP-Final1&2 have been the most stable and the most volatile for BP-Final3. This data 
however does not reflect or include the lost sales and revenues due to the shortage of BP-
Rawl. 
Overall sales demand in Bushy Park is much more stable than in Prince George but 
Bushy Park's sales volumes are lower than in Prince George. Average sales volumes are 
164,137 Kgs for the data period ofPG-Finall versus 60,812 Kgs for BP-Final&2 and 63,316 
Kgs for BP-Final3. 
The difficulty in Prince George is the inability to deal with risk since this is a one 
product line manufacturing site. In Bushy Park the demand variations and risk are related to 
losing or gaining a new customer potentially on the basis of competitiveness in the market 
place based on finished product pricing or product quality. 
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Figure 11- Bushy Park Finished Product Sales July 2007- December 2009 (Kgs) 
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3.9 Estimating risks in dealing with raw material inventories 
We expect the brokers in the case of Bushy Park to better manage the inventories 
BP-Final3 
compared to the self-managed system in Prince George. We expect that because brokers are 
being compensated for their expertise in managing these flows. Hence we expect lower risk 
of shortages and not the severe swings we might see without their facilitation. 
There are of course risks in the delivery of physical inventories (the Kgs of material 
delivered) and risks associated with the financial flows associated with these inventories. In 
terms of financial risk there are really two concerns to the broker and to Kemira. There is the 
variability in prices (a pricing risk) and there is the variability in the overall value of the 
inventories being delivered (Kgs the inventory * price paid). In reality the broker must worry 
about the overall value risk since this represents the value of the inventory which the broker 
must deliver to their end user (Kemira). 
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A straightforward measure of risk whether it is physical flow (Kgs) or financial is the 
coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) or cv associated with these products. 
In terms of physical inventories in the case ofPG-Raw, using the data used to 
produce Figure 7 of the Kgs of inventory, we can estimate a cv of 1.09. In the case of PB-
rawl, from Figure 8 we estimate a cv of0.97 and from Figure 9 the cv for BP-raw2 is 0.97. 
Hence we can see a lower (Kg) variability in both raw materials of Bushy Park 
(Figures 3 and 4) compared to Prince George (Figure 2). That is, it appears that brokers in 
Bushy Park are able to better manage the risks associated with inventory swings. 
We see quite a different result when looking at financial risk. The variability on 
pricing is reversed. On price per Kg, using data from Figure 5, PG-Raw has a cv of0.15 
whereas BP-Rawl the cv is 0.29 and BP-Raw2 is the highest with a cv of0.65. That is, the 
pricing situation in Bushy Park is much more variable (i.e. riskier) than Prince George. 
Hence it would appear the brokers have a much more difficult time managing price 
fluctuations than physical flow variations. 
As well , although arguably more importantly, if we look at the total value of 
inventories we see a similar pattern. Figure 2 in the case ofPG-Raw provides a cv of 1.20. 
For BP-Raw1 using Figure 3 we get a cv of 1.17 and for BP-Raw2 from Figure 4 we get a cv 
of 1.43 These coefficients of variability reflect the month by month variability of the 
inventory in Bushy Park and we assume this variability reflects the risk the broker is facing 
since he/she must supply these raw materials when needed. 
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We can thus see that the broker faces a risk in agreeing to supply goods on 
contingency to Bushy Park. While contracted to deliver to Bushy Park both prices and 
financial value can vary considerably. 
On a contingency basis, the broker must arrange supply from sources (at certain 
prices) and deliver when needed to Bushy Park (in an uncertain quantity and vague time). For 
this the broker charges an FOB/Kg price delivered to Bushy Park. This FOB price times the 
quantity delivered is Figure 3 in the case ofBP-Rawl and Figure 4 in the case ofBP-Raw2. 
At a point in time we can treat this as FOBaushyPark Price * inventory. This, of course, ignores 
the lag effects between when inventory is purchased and when it actually flows into 
inventory but our purpose here is merely to describe a general model. 
The broker must arrange supply. At a point in time we can say this is the (purchase 
price) *(quantity acquired). We of course don't know the purchase price since this is the 
broker's responsibility. Furthermore, the real cost of supply to Kemira would be (I +a)* 
(purchase price) *(quantity acquired) since we would expect the broker to include a profit 
factor (a) into this price to compensate him/her for negotiating the supply contracts. 
Delivery obviously requires costs of handling (packaging, shipping, warehousing etc.) 
for which we expect the broker to charge a markup. While we don't know what these costs 
are, as they are known only to the broker, we can hypothesis that they would be of the form 
(I+~)*[ actual cost/Kg for handling] where a represents the markup (or profit margin) the 
broker charges for such handling activities. 
At the same time the broker must be concerned with fluctuations in financial value of 
the goods being delivered. It is reasonable to suggest that the broker would require a risk 
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premium (which we will call y) since the broker does undertake financial risk in operating on 
consignment. One simple measure of this is to regard this financial risk to be related to the 
variability of these financial flows. At any point in time this variability might be regarded as 
(value of the inventory- average value of the inventoryY'2. Such values can be determined 
from Figure 3 for BP-Rawl and Figure 4 for BP-Raw2. This variability is similar to the 
overall coefficient of variation from these figures but is evaluated for each point in time 
rather than overall (which cv does). 
So we can hypothesis that the broker's view of risk at each point in time would be of 
the form: 
FOB Bushy Park Price *inventory = (1 +fJ) * )* [actual cost/Kg for handling goods in inventory] + 
y*( value of the inventory - average value of the inventory Y' 2 +(1 + a)*(purchase 
price) *(quantity acquired). 
As noted in Section 3.5 of the paper as well as in Table 1, the broker has indicated 
that the costs of handling these inventories are 14% ofthe FOB price which implies: 
0.14*FOBsushy ParkPrice *inventory =0.14*[ (l+{J)*[actual cost/Kg for handling goods in 
inventory] 
So for each ofBP-Raw1 and BP-Raw2 we have two equations that describe how an 
FOBsushy Park would be arrived at. This is not to suggest that this model can be evaluated. We 
do not know the [actual cost/Kg for handling goods in inventory], nor the purchase price of 
materials brought into the pipeline. However, given the contingency model of a broker, we 
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can see that the broker's compensation is comprised of a markup(~) for handling the goods, 
a premium (y) to compensate for financial risk and a profit factor (a) for arranging supply. 
From the point ofview ofKemira implementing an MRP system to gain visibility and 
better manage the flows of inventories is in effect to lower this risk premium (~) . Assuming a 
continuance of the broker approach, likely little can be done to lower the cost since a 
broker's resources are needed over and above the actual handling costs to affect delivery. 
Furthermore, there are costs associated with arranging supply and hence one would not 
expect the profit premium (a) to be eliminated easily. In fact, if the system were to convert to 
an internally managed inventory system, it is likely that additional resources would be 
needed to replace a and ~-
However, one would expect the MRP system, properly utilized to monitor 
information and coordinate better with the broker to have a big impact on reducing 
variability. That is, the coefficient of variation in both physical goods and in the financial 
value to be lowered. The lower overall inventory costs to Bushy Park are in effect, lowering 
this risk premium y. 
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3.10 Summary of Findings and Comparisons 
In Table 1 & 2 we suggest a series comparison (subjective and qualitative) of the two 
plants in meeting each of the MRP objectives utilized in this paper. 
Table 1 - Summary of Results MRP Objective #1: 
Minimize Inventory Levels 
Criteria PG-Raw BP-Raw1 BP-Raw2 
Working Capital Needs High Low due to use of Low due to use of 
broker broker 
Visibility in the Supply Chain? Improved Limited or Lack Limited or Lack of 
Visibility of Visibility due Visibility due to 
to brokerage brokerage 
Frequency of Stock Outs 2/30 8/30 0/30 
Average Month End Inventory 110,185 Kgs 12,303 Kgs 15,262 Kgs 
Month End Inventory Kgs Std Dev. 119,933 11,940 14,741 
Coefficient of Variation 1.09 0.97 0.97 
Average Raw Material Cost $3.48/Kg $12.61 /Kg $3.39/Kg 
Raw Material Cost Std Dev. 0.50 3.70 2.13 
Coefficient of Variation .15 .29 .65 
Average Month End Inventory $ $460,137 $162,641 $64,820 
Month End Inventory$ Std Dev. 551,944 189,710 93,000 
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Coefficient of Variation 1.20 1.17 1.43 
Annual Interest Charges (7%) $32,209.62 $11 ,384.89 $4537.39 
Raw Material Cost Structures 5.3% (Transp.) 14% (Transp. & 14% (Transp. & 
Broker Handling) Broker Handling) 
*BP-Raw1 has expenenced a step-change mcrease which has yet to abate (Figure 5). 
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Table 2- Summary of Results MRP Objective #2: 
Improve product availability and enhance inventory control 
Criteria PG-Final BP Final1&2 BP-Final3 
Composition 60%PG-Raw 10% BP-Raw1 7%BP-Raw2 
and others and others and others 
Meet Customer Demands 100% 75% 100% 
Average Monthly Sales 164,137 Kgs 60,812 Kgs 63,316 Kgs 
Monthly Sales Std Dev. 87,240 21,274 27,356 
Respond Quickly to Changing Somewhat as Partial - some Yes 
Customer Demands? there is customer 
visibility in the demands not met 
supply chain 
Table 3 provides a summary of various effects ofbullwhipping and the effects that it 
had on Kemira's various supply chains. 
Table 3 - Summary Evidence of Bullwhipping and its Effects 
Effect PG-Raw BP-Rawl BP-Raw2 
Poor Demand Forecasting Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9 
Order Batching Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9 
Price Variations Figure 2 F 5·· tgure Figure 5 
The Rationing Game Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9 
Notice the step change m pnce ofBP-Raw1 which has yet to abate 
•••BP-Raw2 price jumped up during the Beijing Olympics but has since subsided 
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Prince George has been able to meet all customer demands ofPG-Final despite 
having two stock outs ofPG-Raw. The plant is carrying more raw material inventory and 
has increased its working capital needs especially since PG-Raw is no longer supplied on 
consignment terms. The trade off from consignment is that there is more transparency in the 
raw material costs ofPG-Raw and Kemira can source PG-Raw more competitively, 
leveraging each of the approved suppliers. When the vendor is offering a price ofPG-Raw 
the vendor knows when the product will ship and when they will get paid. There is no 
ambiguity or unknown variable for the vendor to increase their offered price ofPG-Raw to 
mitigate risk which was present under vendor consignment terms. When pricing requests are 
made, each vendor is offering a price under the same terms and conditions. This 
transparency allows Prince George to track and see true raw material costs changes. 
Some recent improvements have been made to increase visibility in the supply chain 
ofPG-Raw such as information on when a container ships from China and is expected to 
arrive in Canada. Within this visibility however, Kemira still has limited control in the 
supply chain especially in circumstances when there are shortages ofPG-Raw from the 
manufacturer in China or limited ocean cargo space at the Port of China. With this increased 
visibility Prince George can somewhat respond more quickly to changing customer demands. 
Shipment dates ofPG-Raw can be delayed if customer demand is decreasing or if one 
supplier is having raw material availability issues another supplier can be introduced to 
secure adequate raw material inventories. Surprisingly the raw material cost ofPG-Raw was 
the most stable of the three comparison raw materials. Nonetheless increased raw material 
costs eroded profit margins ofPG-Final which were not able to be passed along to Kemira's 
customers. 
so 
BP-Rawl was plagued with the most difficulties throughout the research period. 
Customer demands for BP-Final1&2 were not able to be met and Kemira had to declare force 
majeure and lost numerous customers as result. The price ofBP-Rawl still has not returned 
to pre-Olympic (Beijing 2008) and was the most volatile of the three raw materials in the 
research study. Increased raw material costs have also not been able to be passed along to 
customers ofBP-Final1&2 where profit margins eroded. 
BP-Raw2 was able to meet customer demand and had no stock outs. Raw material 
pricing remained somewhat stable but the profit margins ofBP-Final3 were the most volatile 
and negative for seven consecutive months (October 2008 -April 2009). 
Despite using a broker to manage raw material inventories for BP-Rawl and BP-
Raw2 the plant increased inventory and working capital needs since implementation of the 
ERP/MRP system. Bushy Park has very limited or no visibility in the supply chain. The 
plant relies on regularly scheduled meetings with brokers for inventory status updates. 
Managing of raw materials inventories is being done through the use of an excel spreadsheet 
instead of through the ERP/MRP system. 
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Chapter 4 
4.1 Recommendations and Best Practices 
The purpose of this research project was to evaluate and compare two applications of 
the ERP/MRP system. The external approach in Bushy Park to managing inventory carries 
significantly less working capital requirements to Kemira. The trade off to this lower 
working capital requirement is in higher total delivered raw material costs. Carrying costs in 
Bushy Park represent 14% of the total raw material cost compared to 5.3% in Prince George. 
The external brokers mitigate risk by increasing raw material costs. Prince George carries a 
significantly higher requirement for net working capital however the plant has been able to 
leverage lower raw material costs from the Chinese suppliers which have recently resulted in 
higher profit margins. 
Despite having two different models of managing raw material inventories both 
plants were affected by global events that posed problems in each respective supply chain 
(2008 Beijing Olympics). Both plants responded to the events based on the best available 
information that was available. Prince George was influenced from internal sales pressures 
to reduce raw materials costs and Bushy Park was influenced by fear of raw material 
unavailability to meet future demands. 
The following recommendations can be made: 
1. A better methodology of obtaining expert opinions which foster a disciplined 
communication between the customer, Kemira salesman, plant and raw material 
supplier must begin immediately. Raw material requirements should be updated 
based on early signals of observed customer demand. Lee et al, (2004). 
2. Bushy Park needs to fully implement its purchasing activities in the MRP/ERP 
system. This would include entering purchase orders at the time that 
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requirements are confirmed to each broker. MRP would be used as a primary 
source for reviewing raw material requirements and will reduce the reliance of an 
excel spreadsheet to determine future raw material requirements. Forecasting 
decisions can then be made through MRP and monitored on daily or weekly basis 
instead of in preparation for a monthly meeting with the brokers. 
3. As communication increases and more detailed shipment information is shared 
between the broker and Bushy Park, visibility in the supply chain will improve. 
Information must be shared between the vendor and the buyer as inventory moves 
through the various stages of the supply chain. These stages could be identified 
as: date available for shipment at the port or discharge, actual shipment date, 
shipment information and estimated arrival date at the port of entry. 
4. Improve transparency in the supply chain as much as possible. Solicit 
information from the vendor/broker with the status of in-transit inventory. 
Information would include estimated ship date, actual ship date, estimated arrival 
date into the port of entry and estimated date that the inventory will be available 
to Kemira. Late shipments should be fully investigated to understand the root 
cause to determine if this is a single anomaly or something to take into 
consideration for future shipment. 
5. Ensure a formal review process is completed with all interested parties (plant, 
sales department, customer future demands). This formal review process would 
ensure that all parties are aligned if additional inventory is going to be ordered to 
take advantage of a price promotion. 
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6. Review the working capital needs for the Prince George and Bushy Park Plant. 
These are the only two Kemira locations that rely heavily on critical raw materials 
from China or India which have long lead times. These plants are not the same as 
the rest of the Kemira production facilities who can readily source raw materials 
within one to two days. Consignment in Prince George began as a result of 
meeting blanket corporate wide reduction of net working capital. Much the same 
as Bushy Park whose business model with continuously changing customer 
demand could only survive with having raw material inventories readily available 
at a location in close proximity to the plant from these brokers. 
7. It seems clear from this research that reliance on a single supplier bears 
considerable risk. Wherever possible, the firm should move to mitigate risk by 
introducing a secondary supplier and leveraging each supplier to obtain the lowest 
raw material cost possible. 
The fundamental distinction between the two plants is that of the use of external 
brokers in Bushy Park versus internally inventory management in Prince George. We have 
provided some evidence to suggest that Bushy Park experiences lower variability in raw 
material inventories but at a higher raw material cost. The issue is whether the use of the 
MRP system could provide better control over the inventory swings (i.e. lower variability) 
and concurrently enjoy lower working capital costs in terms of inventory carrying costs. This 
paper suggests that this is the direction in which Kemira should move. 
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